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In this short paper I would like to propose the following: human judgments of morality are not, and 
can not be objective given unavoidable aspects of human neural anatomy. They can be influenced 
by brain damage, your genetics, or even switched up and down in intensity at will using methods 
like Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), which I shall later discuss. Therefore any sense of 
an ability to make objective morality judgments is an illusion.  Consider, for example one realist 
moral philosopher in his room making his decisions in normal circumstances, and another who is 
trapped by a mad scientist manipulating his mental states without him even realizing. Is there really 
a difference between these cases? We will first explore the evidence for thinking there may not be, 
then return to our captive moral philosopher strapped to a TMS device.
While there are multiple ways to both investigate and alter a person's judgment of morality 
this  paper  will  focus  primarily  on  the  'ultimatum  game'  as  a  method  of  measuring  morality 
judgments and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) as the part of your brain making the 
call  as  to  what  is  moral  and  what  is  not.  The  ultimatum  game  developed  by  Güth,  Werner, 
Schmittberger, and Schwarze in 1982 is a stylized representation of negotiation often used when 
exploring  game  theory  and models  of  economics  though more  recently  it  has  been  used  as  a 
measure  of  fairness  judgments  both  by  anthropologists  in  cross-cultural  studies  and 
psychologists/neuroscientists.   In it  one player is given an amount of money and has to offer a 
portion of it  to a second player. If the second player rejects the amount of money offered then 
neither player is allowed to keep any of the money but if the second player accepts the proposal, the 
money is divided along the lines suggested by the first player and kept by the two players.  The two 
players interact anonymously and only once so reciprocation in not an issue.  50/50 splits are almost 
always accepted but splits of 20% or less are often rejected being deemed as “unfair” (Oosterbeek 
et al. 2004; Henrich et al. 2004).  “Humans appear willing to forego material payoffs to punish 
unfair behavior,”  (Wallace et al. 2007). As a side note this behavior of judging fairness and then 
punishing unfair behavior seems unique to humans and is not observable in chimpanzees (Jenson et  
al 2007).
The judgment of fairness of different proportional splits of money can be influenced by 
external  variables  beyond  the  decider's  control.  Studies  in  which  identical  and  fraternal  twins 
separated at birth were measured to find the point at which they made the judgment that an offer 
was unfair have shown that “additive genetic effects account for 42% of the observed variation in 
(the) responder” (Jenson et  al  2007.) and “we estimate that  >40% of the variation in subjects' 
rejection behavior is explained by additive genetic effects.” (Wallace 2007) 
Studies  on  the  effects  of  hormones  on  one  judgment  of  fairness  found  that  “High-
testosterone  men  reject  low ultimatum game offers”  (Burnham 2007) and  that  manipulating  a 
person's serotonin (5-HT) levels will effect their judgments of offers as fair or unfair (Crokett et al  
2008). More dramatically than the above are the ability of TMS to virtually turn judgments of 
fairness up or down.  
Transcranial  Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) is a noninvasive process whereby neurons are 
excited by weak electric currents created by a device using rapidly changing magnetic fields also 
known as electromagnetic induction. A technique using TMS called repetitive TMS (rTMS) can 
actually “turn off” part of the brain for a period of time. Depending on what area of the brain it is  
being used on,  the subject can not even tell  that  they have been affected,  this  is  the case with 
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judgments of when to accept a fair offer. Studies have repeatedly shown that using this technique 
you can alter someone's perception of when it is appropriate to accept an offer (Wouta et al 2005; 
Knoch et al 2006).  More specifically, “After rTMS over the right DLPFC, however, this pattern 
was  changed,  with  longer  reaction  times  for  rejecting  unfair  offers,  and  a  trend towards  more 
acceptances of unfair offers” (Wouta et al 2005). It is worth noting that at least one study – Knoch 
et al 2006 – suggests that patients can still judge the offer as being unfair but has less qualms with 
accepting it.
We readily accept that in certain circumstances our judgments, including moral ones, are 
influenced and could lead us to make bad judgments and decisions. For instance, a person may 
commit actions they would usually deem as immoral if coerced, or drunk or in some variety of high 
stress situation. In these circumstances, however, it seems that there is some alteration in the first-
hand experiences of the agent. In the case of TMS, however, an agent can be entirely unaware that 
they are being effected by certain psychological factors.
The fact that a philosopher's judgments of morality or at the very least how they act on those 
judgments can be so easily influenced leads to a number of interesting questions about human 
perspectives of morality.  For example consider our philosopher held captive and strapped into a 
TMS device. Let's say that he is given the option of escape  if he presses a button that will kill a 
random stranger. While the TMS is acting on him he is more willing to make the less morally hard 
line decision. Later, when the TMS’s effects have worn off he judges his action as morally wrong. 
Is he at fault? It was his own line of logic that lead to him choosing to press the button after all. 
And if he wasn’t at fault, does that mean that the judgment of morality “he made” wasn’t actually 
made by him?  If this is the case then it would mean that if you have a neurochemical state that is 
causing you to make one moral choice over the other and that state is out of your control then you 
are absolved of your choice, but we are all influenced in the same way by both our genes and 
hormone levels. So are no moral choices really our own?  In this  paper I  will  not address the 
questions this has brought up, but perhaps it will give you something to think about, particularly 
next time you make a moral decision...
References
Burnham T (2007). High-testosterone men reject low ultimatum game offers. Proc Biol Sc,. 274, 
1623, 2327–2330 
Crockett M, Clark L, Tabibnia G, Lieberman M, and Robbins T. (2008). Serotonin modulates 
behavioral reactions to unfairness. Science, 27, 320, 5884,1739. 
Henrich, Joseph, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis 
(2004). Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic 
Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. Oxford University Press.
Jensen K, Call J, and Tomasello M (2007). Chimpanzees Are Rational Maximizers in an Ultimatum 
Game. Science, 318, 5847, 107-109
Knoch D, Pascual-Leone A, Meyer K, Treyer V, Fehr E. (2006). Diminishing reciprocal fairness by 
disrupting the right prefrontal cortex. Science, 3, 314, 5800, 829-32. 
 
Oosterbeek, Hessel, Randolph Sloof, and Gijs van de Kuilen (2004). Differences in Ultimatum 
Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis. Experimental Economics, 7, 171–188
23
Sanfey G, Rilling K, Aronson A, Nystrom E, and Cohen D. (2003). The neural basis of economic 
decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Science, 13, 300, 5626, 1755-8. 
Singer T. (2007) The neuronal basis of empathy and fairness. Novartis Found Symp, 278, 20-30
Wallace B, Cesarini D, Lichtenstein P, and Johannesson M (2007). Heritability of ultimatum game 
responder behavior. PNAS, 104. 40. 15631–15634
Wouta M, Kahnb R, Sanfeyd G and Alemanc A (2005). Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation 
over the right dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex affects strategic decision-making.  Cognitive  
Neuroscience and Neuropsychology Neuroreport, 16, 16 7 
24
